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THE NEXT GENERATION PROFESSIONAL PILOT –
NOT YOUR FATHER’S FIRST OFFICER
Captain Brian T. Wilson
Atlantic Southeast Airlines
Atlanta GA
With the demise of the Cold War, the subsequent drawdown of the military, and with many airline pilots opting not
to return from furlough after the recent rash of bankruptcies, the demand side of air carrier pilot hiring has driven
significant changes in new hire pilot demographics. Experience levels of new hire regional pilots are at an all time
low, and are approaching an average well below 1000 hrs of total time and less than 100 hours multi-engine. These
demographics changes bode ill for aviation safety and these changes in new hire pilot demographics are showing up
in increasing incidents and accidents that are related to lack of experience, lack of flight discipline, lower levels of
professionalism and a general lack of maturity. To identify and recruit qualified pilots, there is a desperate need to
employ effective screening and selection tools that will accurately predict the applicant’s success in demanding
airline curriculums.
and procedural discipline. Military flying promotes
and accelerates the acquisition of expertise through a
number of practices such as:

Introduction
The United States economy has seen unparalleled
growth for nearly 20 years and the increasing
globalization of the world economy is also providing
unprecedented growth opportunities around the
world. Despite the recent rash of bankruptcies of
airlines in America and indeed around the world,
aviation is seeing explosive growth in spite of
industry turmoil. Indeed worldwide air travel is
expected to double in the next 20 years and this
growth is well underway.
Since deregulation,
revenue passenger miles have more than doubled in
the United States. In short, despite recent industry
turmoil, the industry will see unprecedented growth
over the next 20 years which is in turn imposing a
high demand for more pilots in the airline industry1.

•
•
•

•

This demand will have to confront the selection and
training needs implied by radical changes in new hire
pilot demographics over the past three decades:
Today, the majority of pilots hired by air carriers
come from civilian backgrounds.2 Historically the
majority of airline pilots were supplied from military
backgrounds with good reason.
Military pilot
selection criteria are highly selective, enabling the
services to begin with excellent raw material. The
training is highly structured and very demanding,
washing out those whose personal discipline,
intelligence, and abilities are found lacking. Only
those individuals who possess the required high-level
innate abilities and underlying cognitive skills
typically make it through the training successfully.

•

Mentorship through pairing new pilots with
older veterans.
Frequent training and review.
The requirement for comprehensive mission
planning enables new aviators to identify
repeating patterns and threats. Through such
detailed planning the aviator in effect
“experiences” the flight before strapping on
the aircraft, planting the seeds that enable
the pilot to exercise recognitional situation
assessment, significantly lowering their
cognitive workload and accelerating the
acquisition of expertise.
Comprehensive debriefing of every mission
reinforces the lessons learned, solidifies
relevant cue patterns, and habituates the
aviator to think reflectively on their
performance and experience. This in turn
builds the metacognitive skills so crucial to
identifying gaps in situational awareness and
violations of expectations.
Constant enforcement and fostering of
professionalism in military aviation.
Military vs. Civilian Pilot Training

In contrast much of civilian pilot training fails to
meet the training and operational standards found in
military flying. Perhaps as much as 50% of all
civilian pilot training occurs at local flight schools
where there is very little structure in comparison and
weak standardization among instructors.
The
majority of the instructors themselves are relatively
inexperienced, just beginning their journey to the
acquisition of expertise. Aeronautical universities do

Advantages of Military Background
The practice of military flying itself reinforces the
disciplines learned in flight school and include
comprehensive preflight planning, attention to detail,
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controls. Despite that, the checklist calls for
a divert to the nearest suitable airport. At
the particular location of the aircraft, the
airports located within the company’s
criteria for the nearest suitable airport are
Bristol TN, Knoxville TN, Asheville NC,
Greenville SC, and Roanoke VA. Of these
airports, Asheville is a mountain airport with
significant terrain in all quadrants and a
single runway that is longer than Roanoke.
Bristol TN is in rolling Appalachian terrain
with a single runway longer than Roanoke.
Knoxville TN is in flat land with two long
runways and with a reserve KC-135
squadron, plenty of fire and crash rescue
equipment. Greenville SC is a flat land
airport with a single runway longer than
Roanoke.
Despite advice from his
dispatcher, the Captain elected to return to
Roanoke VA – the highest risk airport of
those available.4

a better job although the quality of the programs
varies significantly from program to program. Many
of the better programs approach the standardization,
structure, and discipline of military programs but
they all share a significant shortcoming – once the
student graduates, the students are on their own in
terms of acquiring experience, maintaining
professional and procedural disciplines, and gaining
expertise. Whereas in the past the airline industry
could rest assured that they were getting a high
quality, known product from a retiring military
aviator, the civilian world presents them with a wide
range of quality of professionalism, skills, discipline,
and experience. No wonder that in past times, many
airlines hired the vast majority of their pilots from the
military services. Recent events however have
changed that demographic.
Experience-Related Incidents on the Rise
With the demise of the Cold War and the end of the
Vietnam conflict, the military has considerably
curtailed their operations, moved to an all volunteer
force, and closed many bases. This has significantly
reduced the pool of qualified pilots available for
hiring into the airline business. As a result airlines,
especially regional airlines, have significantly
reduced their hiring minimums. Many airlines have
abandoned for instance the requirement for a college
degree. Many regional airlines are hiring former
interns with total flight experience measured in the
low hundreds of hours. Ab initio programs are on the
rise and the trend of hiring pilots with the absolute
minimum experience bodes ill for aviation safety.
Military pilots make up a significant minority of the
pilots hired today. The shortcomings of drawing
pilots fresh out of the civilian training industry are
making themselves felt in the regional airlines today
in any number of areas including professional
discipline, experience, maturity, risk assessment
skills, and team skills. Consider the following actual
incidents from regional airline operations.

Another inflight event highlights problems with risk
assessment skills.
The turboprop commuter aircraft was well
enroute with a company pilot on the
jumpseat when the one of the flight
attendants noticed a metal canister propping
open the waste bin in the aft lavatory. She
removed the canister and noticed it leaking a
foul brown liquid. She called the Captain to
report it. The Captain sent the jumpseater
back to examine it. The jumpseating First
Officer identified it as a personal cannister
of CS tear gas – it was a common product
sold for self-defense. He reported it to the
Captain via the intercom and asked the
Captain what he wanted to do about it. The
Captain, presumably wanting to exercise
good CRM skills, suggested he bring it to
the cockpit where they could all discuss how
to handle the problem. In the subsequent
incident report to the company, the Captain
stated that “fortunately” the only personnel
affected by the fumes were the cockpit and
cabin crew.4

A regional jet departs Roanoke VA.
Roanoke is a mountainous airport ringed on
three sides with close in mountains and for
this particular model of jet, relatively short
runways. About 100 miles into the flight the
aircraft loses all fluid in hydraulic system 2.
Because of redundancies, the only systems
actually lost are the inboard ground spoilers
and the inboard set of brakes. The only
performance thus affected is in stopping
distance on the runway. There is no
immediate inflight issue as there are two
more redundant systems powering the flight

These two incidents reflect the declining level of
experience and absence of the development of critical
thinking skills – just two examples of an increasing
array of experience-related deficits in new hire pilots.
In any segment of the aviation industry, standardized
procedures have been developed to assist pilots in
safely managing their flights. Experienced
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thousands of hours of general aviation time, one has
to recognize that for the most part, the only
professional standard that is imposed on these
aviators is the standards they impose on themselves.
The following incident in regional airline flying was
related to the author and illustrates this concept:

professionals understand the necessity of adhering to
SOP:
Many of these procedures have been
developed after comprehensive analysis including
various task analyses. Some have been developed as
a result of lessons learned – usually after an accident
or serious incident.
In two crew cockpits,
standardized procedures and flight profiles serve a
number of functions:
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

The regional jet crew was approaching the
airport in clear weather but in an area of
scattered showers. After calling the airport
“in sight” they were cleared for a visual
approach to the outboard runway. The First
Officer was flying. After lining up visually
,on the final about 6 miles out the crew flew
into a rain shower encroaching on the final
approach course. Company guidance called
for the initiation of a go-around in this case.
The First Officer after losing sight of the
airport initially announced “going around”
but was immediately countermanded by the
young Captain who stated: “Keep going we’ll break out in a few seconds.” After
many seconds and noticing the localizer
needle was off scale, the First Officer asked,
“We are off the localizer – should I go
around now?” The Captain again demurred,
insisting they would momentarily break out.
They did shortly break out at about 300 ft
agl and lined up with the taxiway.

They define the best balance between safety,
efficiency, and customer service.
They provide a standard against which the
quality of the flight management being
conducted can be measured.
In providing a baseline for performance,
they enable the flight crew to estimate the
amount of safety margin left when an
inadvertent deviation occurs.
They provide a framework for good task
management – spacing out tasks so that no
one crew member becomes overloaded an
loses situational awareness.
They provide for a division of duties so that
one person is always flying the aircraft.
They provide for implicit crew coordination,
reducing the need for the crew to explicitly
coordinate their actions.
This in turn
significantly reduces the cognitive load on
the crew, reducing the probability of
situational awareness loss.
They provide points of feedback / action
loops, in effect requiring the exercise of predetermined actions – actions that in prior
analyses have been found to provide the
highest level of safety. This significantly
reduces in many cases the cognitive
workload to define viable options. The
common prescriptive to go around if not
stabilized by 1000 ft agl on an instrument
approach is one example of this.

The Captain took the controls and initiated a
side step maneuver to the runway at about
100 ft agl in an aircraft with a 70 ft wingspan.
In banking back to line up on the runway,
with all three wheels in the air and the stall
warning stick shaker triggered, the left wing
struck the runway but the Captain was able to
safely continue the landing. After pulling off
the runway, the Captain pulled the CVR
circuit breaker and began trying to persuade
the First Officer to conspire with him to offer
some other explanation of the resultant
damage to the left wing.5

Procedural discipline is one hallmark of the military
aviator. The high levels of enforced discipline and
the constant reinforcement of a professional culture
result in aviators who demonstrate very high levels of
procedural adherence. When military aviators come
to the airline, the “why” behind the requirement to be
procedurally disciplined and the practice of it as part
of being a professional aviator is well known and
familiar. Subsequently there is little or no cultural
transition in this regard when getting hired by an
airline. This is not necessary true of those pilots who
are hired from civilian backgrounds, especially those
who are hired with low total times. Even when hiring
civilian pilots with “quality” flying experience and

Such a lack of professionalism, flight discipline,
integrity and moral character are a dangerous
combination in any high-stakes profession. The
airline in question was lucky to have gotten away
with only minor damage to the wingtip of the aircraft
and a number of frightened and angry customers.
Unfortunately such a lack of professional discipline
can and has killed innocent people as we can see in
the crash of Corporate Express Flight 5066 on
October 19, 2004 in Kirksville MO. The following is
a sample of just a portion of the CVR tape which
contained many more illustrations of the lack of
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The Jetstream impacted the trees well short of the
runway after the crew lost track of their altitude and
descended below the MDA. The NTSB came to the
following conclusions:

professionalism of this crew than the ones just in this
segment of the flight.
HOT 1= Captains Intercom
HOT 2 = First Officer’s Intercom

“The National Transportation Safety Board
determines that the probable cause of the
accident was the pilot’s failure to follow
established procedures and properly conduct a
non-precision approach………
and their
failure to adhere to established division of
duties between the flying and non-flying pilot.

1909:27
HOT 1: “gotta have fun.”
1909:31
HOT 2:
fun.”

“that’s the truth man, gotta have

Contributing to the accident were the pilots’
failure to make standard callouts…….. The
pilots’ failure to establish and maintain a
professional demeanor during the flight and
their fatigue likely contributed to their
degraded performance.”6

1909:35
HOT 1:
“too many of these &%#! (First
Officers) take themselves way too seriously
in this job. I hate it. I have flown with them
and it’s a month of agony.”
1921:44
HOT 2:
“ you know, I think you (the
passengers) are gonna need to just shut the
&%#! up.”

While this may seem a very isolated event, one must
remember the recent findings of the NTSB in the crash
of a Pinnacle Airlines CRJ when it stalled and flamed
out at 41,000 ft. In this accident the NTSB initial
investigation found that a lack of professionalism was
a probable contributing cause to the crash of the
Pinnacle jet7. The recent release of the CVR
transcripts of the crew of Comair 5191 crash in
Lexington which revealed the crew violated sterile
cockpit procedures on their taxi out to the runway also
calls into question whether there is a declining level of
professional discipline in regional pilots8. A review of
past major airline accidents, while it reveals problems
with CRM skills in some accidents, rarely uncovers the
NTSB attributing the crash in whole or in part to a
failure of the crew to exercise flight discipline and
high levels of professionalism. This is increasingly a
new phenomenon in airline aviation.

1921:57
HOT 1: “we have come to the conclusion
that you should all shut the &%#! up.”
1931:00
HOT 2: ‘cleared the approach.”
1931:01
HOT 1: “&%#! approach, you’re &%#!.
&%#! the approach!”
1931:11
HOT 2: (sound of chuckle) (sound of lips
vibrating) that’s funny when it happens
too.(vibrating lip noise) is that a &%#!? Yeah
(sound of laughter) he &%#!. Thirty one.

Better Screening and Selection is Critical
In the midst of all of this cutting up, the Captain
continues the approach and descends below the
MDA. Soon after we hear the following comments:

These incidents, while still few, mask an increasing
number of less critical incidents found to be related to
insufficient discipline, risk assessment skills, critical
thinking skills, maturity and a general lack of
experience in regional airline flying. This trend in
turn argues that the effective employment of pilot
selection instruments and extensive training of pilot
selection personnel will be mandatory to ensure the
safety of the traveling public in the future. And in an
industry that can generate only razor thin profit
margins, avoiding the costs of litigation and an
accident investigation resulting from unqualified and
unprofessional crewmembers through better selection
may well be the key to survival.

1936:44
GPWS warning: “TWO HUNDRED!”
1936:52.2
GPWS warning: “SINK RATE!”
1936:52.8
HOT 1: “no!”
193653.2
HOT 2 “Trees!”
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